

**U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  
Spring Valley FUDS Community Meeting  
Mann Elementary School Auditorium  
Minutes of the January 8, 2008 Community Meeting**

**ATTENDING PROJECT PERSONNEL**

Ed Hughes	USACE, Spring Valley Program Manager
Dan Noble	USACE, Spring Valley Military Munitions Project Manager, RAB Co-Chair
Steve Hirsh	EPA Region 3
Jim Sweeney	District of Columbia, Department of the Environment (DCDOE)
Jim Jones	Baltimore District Deputy District Engineer for Programs and Project Management
Lan Reeser	USACE, Spring Valley Technical Manager
Allyn Allison	USACE-Huntsville, Spring Valley Technical Manager
Bruce Whisenant	USACE-Huntsville
Mike Rehmert	Tech Escort
John Ditillo	ECBC
Deepak Bhinge	Parsons
Joyce Conant	USACE, Public Affairs Office
Carrie Johnston	Community Outreach Program Manager
Maya Courtney	Community Outreach
Demaree Hopkins	Weston Solutions, Inc.

**ATTENDING RAB MEMBERS**

Greg Beumel	Community Co-Chair
Mario Aguilar	Community Member
Mary Bresnahan	Community Member
Dr. Peter deFur	Environmental Stewardship Concepts/RAB TAPP Consultant
David Feary	Community Member
William Krebs	Community Member
Lawrence Miller	Community Member
Lee Monsein	Community Member
Ambassador Howard Schaffer	Community Member



E. Hughes introduced the following project personnel in attendance to answer questions and provide information: Allyn Allison, Technical Manager for the Spring Valley project, Huntsville District Corps of Engineers; Bruce Whisenant, Huntsville District Corps of Engineers; Deepak Bhinge, Parsons, the contractor performing the work at the Glenbrook Recovery site; Mike Rehmert, Technical Escort, responsible for the initial assessment, packaging, and transport of munitions; John Ditillo, Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC), responsible for sample analysis and monitoring and operation of the vapor recovery system active at the Glenbrook Road site; Lan Reeser, Technical Manager for the Baltimore District, who has been active on the project since 1993; and Jim Jones, Baltimore District Deputy District Engineer for Programs and Project Management.

The mission of the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Partnership of EPA and the DDOE is to investigate and identify, then remove or remediate threats to human health or the environment that relate to the World War I activities at American University. All of our activities are posited on protecting human health and the environment. We are identifying unacceptable risks and taking care of them. The project had a 15-year anniversary earlier this month. We know it has been a long time and we do see a potential end to the project. We believe it will take 3 more solid years of work. We have a lot of work to do at Glenbrook Road, which is the last known burial pit in the project area. It is very important that we complete the work safely and thoroughly.

The concerning munition item recovered is a 75-mm shell very consistent on the outside with munitions recovered in the past. Inside, the ordnance technicians told us in early December that it looked like this munition could contain a charge in the burster tube, the element of chemical warfare shells that could explode the munition. In order to have a munition explode, it requires a two-part system — a burster and a fuze. We want to be clear that the munition item that we are talking about does not have a fuze. There is a very, very minimal likelihood that this munition would detonate. We are being very conservative in how we are classifying this munition. We have multiple layers of safety review, including the U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES) in Oklahoma and the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) in Alexandria, Virginia, to make sure we have all the proper measures in place to ensure the safety of our site workers and the safety of the surrounding area.

### **1. Update on the Pit 3 Investigation**

E. Hughes introduced Dan Noble, the Spring Valley Military Munitions Project Manager. D. Noble gave the following presentation:


- We have been working very hard to get into a position where we can start to dig again. We want to be very deliberate and safe in our procedures. If we think there is any slight doubt at all about the planning that we have done, we will stop and make sure we are still safe and operating correctly. The main reason for the shutdown at Pit 3 is a very deliberate, very positive approach to this work.
- A picture was shown of the containment structure on the 4800 block of Glenbrook Road – The structure is a metal box draped with fabric. We were about 4 feet down when we took our pause. It is not a small pit; it is a very large excavation that we are removing. It straddles the property line with the property to the south. In 2001, we were beginning to dig on the on the property we are on now when the property owner declined to renew the right-of-entry to the site. We filled the pit with soil after placing a layer of light-colored sand to mark the deepest area excavated, and moved to other areas of the project. In 2007 the new property owner agreed to allow us access to the property to continue the digging. This past Fall, we started digging in and around the area that was dug in 2001, and we have recovered WWI related items. We are not back to the level where the light-colored sand was put in the pit in 2001, but around that location.
- Army Safety Oversight: The Process

- USACE submits a safety plan to the USATCES. The plan is based on the MCE. Safety oversight of this project is conducted, and all plans need to be certified/approved by various Army and Department of Defense safety boards. As we plan for the work in consultation with our Partners, the property owners, and our citizen’s group: the RAB, we submit our safety plan to USATCES. They then review the safety plan.
- If USATCES concurs with our safety plan, they submit the plan to the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) for approval.
- DDESB approval often comes with stipulations that must be followed if certain conditions are found to be true.
- Maximum Credible Event (MCE) for Pit 3
  - Several credible events that could occur are listed in the safety plan.
  - We analyze the events to determine the one that could have the greatest area of impact. It becomes the MCE.
  - The MCE for Pit 3 is defined as: “The instantaneous release of Arsine from a non-explosively configured 75-mm Mark II chemical projectile.”
    - The Army requires that we give a very detailed statement on our MCE because that is the design consideration of our safety protocols. As we dig into the pit, however, we always have the potential to find something that doesn’t quite fit the MCE because it is so detailed. We have to pause if we come across something that falls outside the stated definitions.
- Handling American University Experiment Station (AUES)-Related Closed Cavity Munition Items
  - Each item is individually assessed on-site by the U.S. Army’s Technical Escort Unit Munitions Experts (Tech Escort) as a closed cavity item. They determine (by visual inspection) if it is safe for packaging, transport, and storage. The visual inspection is quite effective. An expert can tell a lot about the item by looking at it.
  - Once the item is considered to be safe, it is packaged in a Multiple Round Container (MRC) inside the Engineering Control Structure at Pit 3. The MRC is a steel container specially designed for moving and storing chemical munitions.
  - The items are sealed and transported by Tech Escort (under a U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT] permit) to the Federal Property Interim Holding Facility for X-ray and Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy analysis (as required).
  - Several closed cavity items have been found. The items are currently stored at the Federal Property.
- Spring Valley FUDS, Pit 3
  - Pit 3 intrusive activities began October 29. As we accumulate the items and data from the X-ray and Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy, we send the data off-site to the Materiel Assessment Review Board (MARB). They are independent of our project. They review the

data and make a determination about what the data are telling us about the item. That becomes the Army's official, formal opinion about an item we have recovered.

- Pit 3 intrusive operations paused on December 5, in response to an initial assessment by the MARB of one munition item. The assessment indicated that the item was a probable arsine fill, potentially with energetic material present.
- Shut down was required as the result of a pre-set operating condition mandated by the DDESB. The Approval Memorandum received from DDESB stated in Paragraph 8 that if we find an exception to the MCE, we have to submit an amendment to our safety plan. This was not a pause in alarm, it was a preset condition. Paragraph 8 reads as follows:
  - o "If explosively configured chemical munitions are discovered at Spring Valley FUDS or if packing material inside the 7 x 27 MRC exceeds the 6-inch packing material height limit, an amendment to this site plan must be submitted to DDESB for approval."

A line drawing was shown of a 75-mm shell without a fuze. The round that was removed is unfuzed. The fuze is external and would project outside the body of the shell, which is why visual inspection by experts is so effective. The body of the round holds the chemical, and the burster well holds the explosive, which could explode if fuzed, and release the chemical.



American 75-mm. chemical shell.

D. Noble displayed a sample of a 75-mm round recovered at the Edgewood Arsenal. It was cut-away for use as a training aid and showed the round and the fuze cavity. The hexagonal nut and threading for the fuze were visible. The round was in the ground for about 40 years. It was noted that they are very heavy, rugged items.

An X-ray was shown of the 75-mm round that was found. The MRC was visible surrounding the round. The round was sitting on a vermiculite cushion, which was not visible in the X-ray. The hexagonal nut, burster well, and area where the fuze would attach were clearly seen. The liquid fill line was clearly visible in the main cavity of the round.

- The Materiel Assessment Review Board (MARB) determined:

- “Item SVM-07-162 was found to contain a 90% liquid fill and energetics are present in the burster. PINS spectrum analysis for this item determined a probable arsine fill. This item is recommended for Explosive System Demilitarization.”
- Without the fuze, it has a very low probability of a detonation. During WWI these types of rounds were handled and shipped all over the world with a charge in the burster.
- Although the munition has been classified as “Explosively Configured”:
  - The classification does NOT mean that there is an imminent threat of detonation.
  - It does mean that energetic material (a charge in the burster) is present in the munition.
  - A munition requires an explosive “chain” to be present (a fuze and a burster) and initiated for a detonation to occur. That “chain” is NOT present in this item (nor for any item recovered at Spring Valley).
- DDESB Consideration of Maximum Credible Event USACE/USATCES Proposal:
  - The amendment we submitted states that the MCE definition will be changed to read: “The instantaneous release of arsine from a 75-mm Mark II chemical projectile with a burster.”
  - The hazard distance of 742 feet will remain the same at the dig site.
- Bottom Line
  - The safety of the public and our workers remains the top concern.
  - No changes are proposed for procedures at the Pit 3 dig site.
  - Changes, if any, may be implemented at the Interim Holding Facility on the federal property. These changes need to be determined and implemented before work proceeds.
- Pit 3 Time Line:
  - We estimated 14 weeks for the Intrusive Investigation.
    - We have completed 4 weeks of work and have 10 weeks of work to go.
    - We hope to get back to work this month and will inform the community of the date we plan to restart operations. We do not have a specific date at this point.

## 2. Community Questions

The question and answer period was moderated by P. Leibach of Councilmember Cheh’s office.

Question from Ginny Durrin, Audience Member, Spring Valley resident – What makes the round that you found different from others found before?

D. Noble said the round is different because the MARB could not rule out the possibility that energetics were present in the burster well. Because they could not rule it out completely, they concluded that it was explosively configured. This is only the second time that we have found an explosively configured round at Spring Valley.

Question from Kent Slowinski, Audience Member,– Is there a safer alternative than Bender Arena for American University students to gather in the event of a chemical explosion at the site? It is a low-lying area and gas could collect there. Could the emergency response personnel review whether or not that is a safe place for students to congregate?

Anthony McElwee, 2<sup>nd</sup> District, District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) said he was not too familiar with why the site was chosen. He offered to check and get back to K. Slowinski.

D. Noble also agreed to investigate the site selection.

Bernie Schultz, American University, member of the RAB, said the decision to use Bender Arena was made because it is far enough away from the dig to be safe and could hold a number of people in an enclosed area that would not put people at risk.

Question from Charlie Bermphohl, Audience Member, *Northwest Current* – The place where the students would go is in a low lying area. They might have to come from far-flung areas around the campus, race to that low-lying area, and the gas is seeking a low lying area at a certain speed. Does the Army Corps agree with the safety of this location on the campus?

E. Hughes said the gas may or may not seek a low-lying area. It would depend on the atmospheric conditions at the time of the event.

B. Schultz said the Arena is not within the circle of shelter-in-place. Any one outdoors within that area or near the athletic fields when the siren goes off would follow the instructions on the University signs directing them to the arena. The main protection is shelter-in-place. Students already inside a building would stay in the building at other locations on campus.

Question from P. Leibach – How far outside the circle is Bender located?

B. Schultz said he would research the answer and provide that information.

Question from C. Bermphohl – You would want them to shelter-in-place?

B. Schultz said if they are in a building elsewhere on campus, they should stay in the building or return to the building they have exited. Students or others on the athletic fields or in the open should go to Bender Arena.

Scott Kane, District of Columbia Fire & Emergency Medical Services Agency (DC FEMS) noted that the policy for emergency protection is to shelter-in-place. The Bender Arena location is provided as an alternative for those not in a building, but nearby.

Question from Marcia McBride, Audience Member – Where do people go who live a block away from the site? I have lived for the last 15 years with this situation.

S. Kane said that all residents were urged to shelter-in-place inside their homes.

C. Johnston explained the shelter-in-place concept and provided training materials to M. McBride.

Question from Michelle Seiver, Audience Member – I live near Dalecarlia and am more concerned about the storage facility. The munitions are put in the cylinders. Are they ever taken out of the cylinders? How many do you plan to store there? What about catastrophic lightning in the area?

Allyn Allison, USACE-Huntsville, Spring Valley Technical Manager, stated that once a round goes into the MRC, it will stay in the MRC. The X-ray that you saw was taken through the sealed MRC. The only time we take the round out of the MRC is for final destruction. One of the safety features of the Interim Holding Facility is lightning protection. The structures are grounded and locked. There is 24 hour guard surveillance when items are stored there and the facility has a security fence around it.

Once the items are stored in the facility, another agency is responsible for the destruction of the material under certain protocols. In 2003 we brought machinery on-site to destroy the items on the federal

property. The number of items recovered can also impact the selection of the best way to dispose of them. The current plan is to fully excavate the Pit 3 site and then determine the best way to dispose of the material. They will be at the facility for an indeterminate period of time. Another element of the safety of the containers is that if something were to happen in one container, it does not propagate to another container. There also is a fire suppression system on the containers.

E. Hughes stated that when the Army excavated part of Pit 3 in 2001-2002, we destroyed the rounds the next spring. A dialogue is ongoing with folks at the Pentagon to try to make the disposal of the recently recovered round happen as quickly as we can.

Question from Tom Smith, Audience Member, ANC Commissioner, associated with American University – What are energetics? Have you identified the energetics in the shell?

Mike Rehmert, Tech Escort said that energetics are explosives and that the round contains either TNT or a TNT and tetroyl mix.

Question from T. Smith – What types of changes are you anticipating to the storage procedure because of the new munition?

D. Noble said DDESB is still discussing whether or not we need to add another level of safety to the site because the round has energetics in the burster. The concern that DDESB is expressing is that if the round were to detonate inside the MRC, although we can't think of a credible reason why it would do so, it could depressurize the MRC and allow the MRC to leak, and the gas to leak out. DDESB is considering whether we want to filter the holding facility the way we filter the site.

Question from Audience Member – Is arsine the same as lewisite? How many pits of munitions are there across the U.S.? Are we the only one?

M. Rehmert said arsine is not the same as lewisite. It is an industrial compound. The Army has dug sites from Guam to Alabama to California, Arkansas to Alaska and around the world. Most sites are WWII training facilities that were only open during the war years and then were turned back to civilian use.

Question from Rachel Thompson, Audience Member, ANC Member – Why prepare for longer term storage? Why not just get the stuff out of here more quickly?

D. Noble said that no matter how much we were able to speed up the munition destruction process, we have to provide correct storage for the items for some period of time.

Peter deFur, RAB TAPP Consultant, suggested explaining why we don't destroy the munitions one at a time.

D. Noble said it is very difficult to set up the machinery needed to destroy the items. We need regulatory approval to set up and use the equipment. It is also problematic to move the items outside of the District.

Question from M. Seiver, Audience Member – Why not move it to a national destruction facility? And also, will the canister leak?

D. Noble said the canister will not leak. The concern of DDESB is that somehow, the munition might detonate inside the MRC. Again, no one can see how that could be possible, but that is the scenario that DDESB is considering.

Greg Beumel, RAB Co-Chair said there are political issues to transporting the munitions. In the 1990's when the project was operating as an emergency response action, helicopters transported the munitions out of DC. This is not an emergency situation, and DC and states do not easily permit moving explosives great distances or over state lines.

P. Leibach noted we may build a destruction facility on-site.

Question from M. Seiver – Are we going to become a destruction or storage facility?

D. Noble said that we will not become a facility to store and destroy munitions other than those found in Spring Valley.

Question from M. Seiver – What is the capacity of the facility?

A. Allison said at one time the Army did move material to destruction facilities such as the one at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, or Aberdeen Proving Ground. Now states refuse to allow it. Other states want us to take care of our waste. The holding facility probably has the capability to hold several hundred rounds as we did in 2003. We would not open a facility to destroy waste found in Maryland or elsewhere. Once we know the scope of the munitions that we have here, the intent would be to destroy the munitions on-site. In 2003 we brought two separate technologies on-site and destroyed the items in a deliberate and controlled process.

Question from Mary Bresnahan, RAB Member – You said the munition wasn't fused, so it is not a danger. Then said should the container explode, although no one thinks that is at all probable, it might leak. Isn't there another container, such as they use to store spent nuclear fuel rods, that would be safer?

D. Noble said they were using a certified container.

A. Allison said the container is North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-certified and drop-tested for chemicals. The container you are talking about has been specifically designed for radioactive material. This container has been specifically designed to store chemical munitions. Everything has its limitations. This container is the only one approved by DOT and certified by NATO for use around the world. This container is the best container I know of. When we use a container then take the round out of the container and destroy it, the container is re-certified before it is put back into active use.

M. Bresnahan noted that we have to take care of the round as quickly as possible.

Councilmember Cheh joined the meeting and thanked the audience and participants for attending.

Question from Nan Wells, Audience Member, ANC Commissioner – Are part of these issues because of funding? Will any of the information you are learning cause you to increase the strength of the containment structure? If so, is there an issue of funding in the issues of transporting munitions out of the District or building a stronger containment facility?

E. Hughes said funding is always a consideration, but it is not the main criteria in any of these decisions.

Question from Dr. Jeff Kraskin, Audience Member – Why is sand showing up in the picture taken inside the containment structure? I understand you filled the pit with sand when the dig was stopped previously.

D. Noble stated that when we were digging in 2001, the property owner on the 4825 side of the pit declined to renew the right-of-entry. When we stopped the dig, we packed both sides of the pit with sand.

Question from J. Kraskin – Was the item found in the sand?

D. Noble said that the item was found in an area not dug before. The sand in the picture is new sand, part of the floor of the current excavation.

Question from J. Kraskin – Why aren't you below the sand? If you are still showing sand in the picture, you are still digging in the previous area, so I can't figure out how you found a new shell.

D. Noble stated that the current excavation is larger than it was in 2001, and the whole excavation is inside the structure. The whole area is being dug at once. Approximately 60 to 70% of the material we are digging was not dug before, and 30 to 40% is material that we had placed there previously.

Question from J. Kraskin – Was the type of shell with the burster full ever found before anywhere in Spring Valley? If so, when you were planning this dig, why didn't you take that into consideration so that the stoppage would not be required? If you found it previously, then you knew that the possibility existed that it was there and it should have been part of the MCE.

D. Noble replied that the Army did take it into account. We had several credible events in our safety plan. We found this type of shell with a burster before. That shell was filled with mustard. We considered the possibility of finding an explosively configured mustard round as a credible event. The safety distance for that was about 220 feet or so. We had also previously found three shells that were arsine filled that were not explosively configured. The safety distance for the arsine was 742 feet. We used the event requiring the greatest safety distance as our MCE.

Question from J. Kraskin – Why did you accept the memorandum stating that if explosively configured munitions were found at Spring Valley an amendment to the site plan must be submitted? If you knew it was possible, if you had seen one before, why did you accept that comment?

D. Noble said it was not an option at the time.

Question from J. Kraskin – It doesn't make sense that every time you find an explosively configured chemical munition you have to stop the project again. Is that true?

D. Noble said that we would not have to stop again because it is now in our safety plan.

Question from J. Kraskin – So if you have it in there now, why didn't you have it in there in the first place?

D. Noble replied that we submitted our safety plan to DDESB. They came back and said we may start, but added the preset condition.

Question from J. Kraskin – You had found one before, why was it a preset condition?

D. Noble stated that of all the munitions found in the past, one was explosively configured. We considered it prudent to move forward with our operations under that preset condition, given the fact that it had only happened once in all of the hundreds of rounds that we had found. We had considered it in our planning and now we can move ahead under our amended plan.

Question from Tessa Morris, Audience Member – I have been a Spring Valley resident for over 30 years. I am also in real estate, so I am in the business of selling Spring Valley. What are we doing to get out the word in a public relations effort to the larger audience that we do not have a public health problem? There was a Johns Hopkins study that said there was no pathology in Spring Valley.

Councilmember M. Cheh – One reason we are having this meeting is not just for the immediate audience, but for everybody to have a conversation. Out of that conversation we can assure ourselves that we are confident that the project is going well and that there are no by-product effects. The ability to get the word out depends on public exposure to sessions such as this. I would hope that that would be one of the benefits of this meeting.

T. Smith suggested that the health study should be continued. It was an interim study, never intended to be the final health study in this area. The challenge would be to continue the health study and to get additional funding from the DC government to do the second stage of the health study. As a member of the community, I would look to the Councilmember to help us get the funds to enable the health study to continue so that the public and residents can be totally sure that our health is not at risk.

Councilmember M. Cheh stated that the budget is being put together by the council. She has submitted a Mayor's memorandum requesting \$750,000 to continue the study.

N. Wells thanked Councilmember Cheh for making the request. We want to keep pushing. We have been told that people in Spring Valley don't write letters to the Mayor. She offered to assist anyone desiring to write to the Mayor. In the initial Johns Hopkins study, we looked better than Chevy Chase in most areas. In one area, our statistics are high and could indicate that we have been exposed to certain kinds of chemicals. There is some evidence that needs further examination in the health study.

M. Bresnahan noted that everyone could help the US Army Corps to complete the work in Spring Valley by encouraging all residents to grant right-of-entry to have their property tested. She applauded the efforts of the Corps in following up on the right-of-entry requests.

Question from Sarah Vassiliou, Audience Member – Have the other burial pit projects mentioned been successful? Were they residential?

M. Rehmert said that all the sites have been completed. Some are residential; some are industrial.

Question from T. Smith – Is the US Army Corps aware of complaints raised by students in Anderson Hall, following the November 5<sup>th</sup> siren test, that they could not hear the test inside their dormitories? If you are aware of that, are you planning to turn up the volume?

D. Noble replied that there are no dormitories within the shelter-in-place zone.

T. Smith said they are just outside the circle. It was reported in *The Eagle* the week after the test that they could not hear the siren.

B. Schultz stated that the University received some complaints from staff and students in other buildings also. His understanding is that the volume has been adjusted. The concern has been addressed. *The Eagle* has not done a follow-up article because we have been on break.

Question from Susan Elliott, Audience Member – I've lived on Overlook Lane for 28 years and have lived through all of the stages of the project. A couple of years ago, the US Army Corps published a timeline. It stated that in 2009, the Army Corps will enter the Dalecarlia Woods to determine if there are any pits there. Can you assure me that it will be done?

E. Hughes said that it is the Army's plan to conduct a geophysical investigation in Dalecarlia Woods. Some geophysical testing has already been done and more is planned. We know that there was an impact area there in the WWI timeframe. It is definitely in our plan to investigate the area in 2009.

Question from S. Elliott – Will more intrusive investigation be conducted if some munitions are found?

E. Hughes said that the Anomaly Review Board would review the data and would determine what anomalies should be selected for investigation.

Question from S. Elliott – Would the data be shared?

E. Hughes said the Partners will be continuing to work with the RAB. One-on-one updates could also be made available.

Question from K. Slowinski – In 2002 three arsine rounds were removed from the Dalecarlia facility and shipped to Battelle Institute. Can someone explain why it was arranged, how it was arranged, and could it be done for any arsine shells removed today?

D. Noble said that the three rounds referred to were shipped to a U.S. laboratory because the discovery of arsine is very rare. This is the only location in the United States where arsine-filled rounds have been found. The non-intrusive analytical methods used at the time made it difficult to conclude that the chemical was definitely arsine. The rounds were drilled and tested directly to confirm that the fill was arsine. It took a lot of effort to be allowed to ship the round to the special research facility. It was done as a research effort, not as a disposal effort. Now that we have done that work and we understand what an arsine spectrum looks like, it may be difficult to convince an off-site regulatory agency to let us ship the round so more research could be done.

### 3. Closing Remarks

Councilmember M. Cheh – At the end of the day, three questions need to be answered:

1. How can people be assured that you have sufficiently surveyed the area at Pit 3, that the test results are accurate, and you have communicated the results?
2. How do you safely remediate what you find?
3. What are the potential health effects over time?

We need a firm response from the Army Corps. Those are the three questions that have to be answered. We need responses to those questions for the community. Can I have a commitment to answer those three questions?

E. Hughes agreed with the request. He noted that he thinks the process ongoing here, where we work in Partnership with our regulatory partners, EPA and DDOE, and work closely with local elected officials and the Restoration Advisory Board, affords us proper access to good verification and validation of the work as it progresses. We have planned an overall sitewide remedial investigation/feasibility study for the remaining years of the project to tie everything together that we have found since 1993.

Councilmember M. Cheh noted that interim best answers to the questions are needed now. We need an understanding of where we are, what we have left to be done, and where we are going. Once we have that kind of clarity, I think we will be in much better shape. If you could provide that to the council, the ANC, and the RAB, that would be good.

E. Hughes said the Partners would take on the request as a tasker.

#### **4. Adjourn to Individual Questions and Answers**

P. Leibach thanked the RAB, the audience, and the participants and adjourned the meeting at 9:00 p.m.