

1.0 Human Health and Safety

1.1 Introduction

This Technical Memorandum describes human health and safety conditions in the Proposed Action's Region of Influence (ROI) and potential impacts from the Proposed Action (Preferred Alternative) and No Action Alternative. Measures to reduce potential adverse effects to human health and safety from the Proposed Action are identified.

This Technical Memorandum focuses on the health and safety of construction workers, Currency Production Facility (CPF) employees, and people within the ROI during normal activities, potential accidents, and potential intentionally destructive acts, such as acts of terrorism or armed intruders at the proposed CPF.

Treasury received comments related to health and safety from stakeholders during the public scoping period. These comments generally expressed concern about potential human health impacts from vehicle, construction, and operational air emissions associated with the proposed CPF.

Please refer to Treasury's [Public Scoping Report](#) for further details on the comments received during the scoping period. Concerns expressed during public scoping regarding human health and safety are considered and addressed in this analysis, where appropriate. Please refer to the [Air Quality Technical Memorandum](#) for potential Proposed Action impacts on human health from air pollutant emissions.

1.2 Affected Environment

1.2.1 Region of Influence


The ROI for this analysis includes the Project Site and areas within 0.25 mile of the Project Site (see **Figure 1**). The ROI includes all areas where human health and safety could reasonably be affected by the Proposed Action.

1.2.2 Applicable Guidance

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the primary federal agency overseeing worker safety, protection, and health. OSHA establishes required worker protection standards to prevent and minimize potential safety and health risks. State and federal agencies often establish safety, health, and environmental programs and systems to comply with OSHA requirements.

Occupational safety and health (OSH) programs address the health and safety of people at work. These programs impose regulatory requirements for the benefit of employees and the public, including implementation of engineering and administrative practices that reduce risks of illness, injury, death, and property damage. OSH regulations cover potential exposure to a wide range of chemical, physical, and biological hazards and ergonomic stressors. The regulations are designed to control these hazards by eliminating exposure via administrative or engineering controls, substitution, or use of personal protective equipment (PPE).

Table 1 identifies federal and state guidance and regulations relevant to this analysis. Treasury would comply with these guidelines and requirements under the Proposed Action.



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Figure 1: Human Health and Safety ROI

Table 1: Human Health and Safety Applicable Guidance and Regulations

Guidance/Regulation	Description/Applicability to Proposed Action
<u>Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 United States Code [USC] 651 et seq.)</u>	Establishes standards for safe and healthful working conditions for working people in the United States and authorizes enforcement of those standards.
<u>OSH Standards for General Industry (29 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 1910)</u>	Governs day-to-day safety in the workplace and general industry where specific standards applicable to the agricultural, construction, and maritime industries do not apply.
<u>OSH Standards for Construction (29 CFR 1926)</u>	Governs construction industry workplace safety.
<u>Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees (29 CFR 1960)</u>	Sets forth basic provisions to assure safe and healthful working conditions for federal employees.
<u>Executive Order (EO) 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees (1980)</u>	Provides additional provisions to assure safe and healthful working conditions for federal employees.
<u>Maryland Occupational Safety and Health (MOSH) (Code of Maryland Regulations [COMAR] 09.12.20)</u>	Enforces state and federal laws and regulations pertaining to worker health and safety. Establishes Maryland OSH regulations for all non-federal, public and private sector workplaces in the state (MOSH, 2019).
<u>US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Manual for Safety, Health, and Environmental Management Program (Manual 160.0)</u>	Establishes the regulatory procedures for forming a Safety, Health, and Environmental Management program. Aims to achieve accident-free task performance between employees, machines, and the environment.
Beltsville Agricultural Research Center (BARC) Construction Safety Manual	Outlines safety procedures for construction projects and activities at BARC.

39 **1.2.3 Existing Conditions**40 *Treasury*

41 Treasury's Office of Environment, Health, and Safety (OEHS) manages worker health and safety at
 42 Treasury's Washington, DC Facility (DC Facility). OEHS has established an Environmental Management
 43 System (EMS) to improve worker health and safety programs. OEHS' health and safety goals include
 44 maintaining a downward trend in occupational injury and illness rates and engaging personnel at all levels
 45 to implement health and safety improvements (BEP, 2017).

46 While Treasury's currency production process is highly automated with minimal physical labor, OEHS works
 47 to minimize exertion and worker fatigue to the extent possible. Supervisory and health and safety personnel
 48 are present during all shifts to monitor tasks being performed, worker safety, and the potential for accidents.
 49 Treasury personnel also receive periodic training on ergonomics and other safe work practices; OEHS
 50 provides readily available safety guidance.

51 Treasury workers use, handle, and store hazardous materials required for the currency production process
 52 in accordance with manufacturer directions, applicable federal and state regulations, and established
 53 Treasury procedures. Treasury personnel receive periodic training on the use of hazardous materials and

54 wear appropriate PPE when handling such materials. When not in use, Treasury stores hazardous materials
55 in appropriate cabinets and lockers that are only accessible to authorized personnel. Cleanup kits are
56 placed strategically in Treasury facilities for use in the event of an accidental hazardous material spill.
57 Trained Treasury workers dispose of hazardous waste in appropriate receptacles. A licensed contractor
58 periodically collects and properly disposes of these wastes at a permitted landfill or facility. Treasury workers
59 who use, handle, and store hazardous materials adhere to applicable requirements and procedures that
60 greatly reduce or remove risks to human health and safety. Please refer to the [Hazardous and Toxic](#)
61 [Materials and Waste Technical Memorandum](#) for additional information on hazardous materials and
62 hazardous waste.

63 Treasury restricts access to its facilities to authorized personnel and visitors. Authorized personnel have
64 identification badges with magnetic card readers to facilitate their access; visitors are escorted by
65 authorized personnel. Treasury maintains an on-site police force to provide security for its facilities and
66 currency shipments. The Treasury police force also screens vehicles entering and exiting the facilities for
67 unauthorized cargo and passengers.

68 Potential threats to Treasury facilities include vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (i.e., “car
69 bombs”), workplace shootings, and unauthorized access by intruders or trespassers. To date, no
70 detonations of intentional harmful explosives or workplace shootings have occurred at any Bureau of
71 Engraving and Printing (BEP) facility over its more than 100-year history. The Treasury police force typically
72 resolves unauthorized access situations within seconds or minutes and intruders and trespassers are
73 infrequent; BEP personnel and property have never experienced injury or damage from such violations.

74 The Treasury police force identifies and deters potential threats through rigorous screening of vehicles and
75 visitors entering Treasury facilities, as well as other active and passive security measures. The Treasury
76 police force follows established procedures to deter or neutralize perceived threats. Treasury constantly
77 reviews potential threats and updates its training and procedures to respond to such threats.

78 While Treasury sufficiently manages employee and visitor safety and security to the extent practicable, the
79 DC Facility’s age and physical configuration limit opportunities for improvements and upgrades. In the DC
80 Facility, production functions are spread across multiple floors and wings of the building, resulting in
81 manufacturing processes that are inefficient and pose safety risks to staff. Fragmented storage across
82 multiple floors, present additional risks to workers.

83 The DC Facility is more accident-prone than the more modern Western Currency Facility. In 2015, 19 of the
84 23 “lost time” workplace injuries across all BEP facilities were sustained at the DC Facility (BEP, 2018).
85 Further, the DC Facility’s location does not allow Treasury to comply with modern physical security
86 standards (e.g., security setback distances) in accordance with [Interagency Security Committee standards](#)
87 (ISC, 2016).

88 *Beltsville Agricultural Research Center (BARC)*

89 The USDA restricts BARC access to authorized personnel and visitors. Existing safety and security
90 measures include fencing around portions of BARC and security personnel posted at entrances to specific
91 buildings. The USDA provides regular health and safety training for BARC personnel (USDA, 2018).

92 The USDA handles, stores, and disposes of hazardous materials and wastes in accordance with applicable
93 federal and state regulatory requirements; they do not pose a risk to human health. Please refer to the
94 [Hazardous and Toxic Materials and Waste Technical Memorandum](#) for additional information on
95 hazardous materials and hazardous waste.

96 *Project Site*

97 The Project Site currently has a chain-link security fence parallel to Odell Road. This fence contains one
98 locked, unstaffed gate at the northern end of Poultry Road. No additional fencing separates the Project Site
99 from adjacent land within BARC.

100 As discussed further in the [Hazardous and Toxic Materials and Waste Technical Memorandum](#), five
101 Areas of Concern (AOCs) were previously identified in the ROI in accordance with the Comprehensive
102 Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). Following cleanup actions
103 at these AOCs in the late 1990s, the AOCs no longer pose an elevated or unacceptable risk to human
104 health. The AOCs received regulatory closure between 2009 and 2010 (USDA, 2009a; USDA, 2009b;
105 USDA, 2009c; USDA, 2009d; USDA, 2010).

106 There are medical and first responder services within a 3-mile radius of the Project Site:

- 107 • The [University of Maryland Laurel Medical Center](#) is approximately 3 miles north from the Project
108 Site. The hospital includes an emergency department and critical care facilities (UMD, 2019).
- 109 • A [Patient First urgent care clinic](#) is approximately 2 miles southwest of the Project Site. The facility
110 is open daily from 8:00 am to 10:00 pm and provides primary care treatment for common illnesses
111 and injuries (Patient First, 2020).
- 112 • The [Beltsville Volunteer Fire Department Station 31](#) is approximately 1 mile west of the Project Site.
113 Station 31 is staffed continuously and services approximately 21 square miles, including the Project
114 Site (BVFD, 2020).
- 115 • The [Beltsville Police Department, District 6 Station](#), is approximately 2 miles west of the Project
116 Site. District 6 encompasses the northernmost region of Prince George's County, including the
117 Project Site, and covers the communities of Beltsville, Calverton, Greenbelt, and unincorporated
118 Laurel (Prince George's County, 2020).

119 **1.3 Environmental Effects**

120 This section analyzes the potential impacts on human health and safety within the ROI that could occur
121 under the Proposed Action (i.e., Preferred Alternative) and the No Action Alternative. Measures to reduce
122 potential adverse impacts on human health and safety from the Proposed Action are also identified.

123 **1.3.1 Approach to the Analysis**

124 Treasury made the following assumptions in conducting this analysis:

- 125 • Construction activities would adhere to applicable federal and state OSH regulations, as well as
126 established industry and trade-specific procedures, to minimize the potential for construction-
127 related accidents.
- 128 • Treasury would continue to adhere to all federal and state OSH regulations and practices applicable
129 to the workplace in general and to the currency production process specifically, particularly
130 regarding the use, storage, handling, and disposal of hazardous materials and hazardous waste
131 associated with such processes.
- 132 • Safety and security measures at the proposed CPF (e.g., building setbacks, vehicle access control
133 points [ACPs], personnel access measures, Treasury police force staffing and presence) would be
134 implemented in accordance with all current and future federal regulations, state regulations, and
135 Treasury practices and procedures. These measures would be sufficient to prevent, deter, or

136 neutralize potential intentionally destructive acts occurring at the proposed CPF or ensure their
137 potential effects are contained within the boundaries of the proposed CPF.

138 For this analysis, Treasury defined a significant adverse impact as one that would:

- 139 • Violate applicable federal and/or state safety regulations.
- 140 • Directly result in the permanent disability or death of one or more persons within the ROI due to an
141 accident or intentionally destructive act during construction or operation of the Proposed Action.

142 1.3.2 No Action Alternative

143 Under the No Action Alternative, Treasury would not construct or operate the Proposed Action at BARC.
144 Treasury would continue to operate the existing DC Facility in accordance with existing safety and security
145 practices and regulations. The majority of all BEP “lost time” workplace injuries, however, currently occur
146 at the DC Facility (BEP, 2018). Future opportunities to reconfigure the aging DC Facility to address evolving
147 safety and security risks would continue to be limited, potentially increasing Treasury’s susceptibility to
148 workplace accidents or security incidents (see **Section 1.2.3**). Therefore, the No Action Alternative would
149 result in a continued **less-than-significant adverse impact** to human health and safety, specifically for
150 Treasury staff.

151 1.3.3 Preferred Alternative

152 **Construction**

153 *Normal Activities*

154 Qualified, trained contractors with applicable licenses/certifications would perform construction activities.
155 Construction would not require any specialized construction practices and would be consistent with federal
156 construction process requirements.

157 Outdoor construction activities would be performed during daytime working hours in conditions with ample
158 lighting and appropriate weather. Indoor construction, once the proposed CPF’s exterior shell is completed,
159 would be performed in the same manner. Further, all construction activities would be performed within a
160 secured perimeter at the Project Site and would only be accessible to authorized personnel.

161 Treasury would require construction contractors to perform activities in accordance with all applicable
162 federal and state OSH regulations and requirements, as well as established, trade-specific procedures.
163 Treasury would require construction contractors to handle, store, and dispose of hazardous materials and
164 wastes in accordance with applicable federal and state regulatory requirements. Additionally, construction
165 contractors would adhere to site-specific health and safety plans and safe work practices. Therefore, normal
166 construction activities under the Preferred Alternative would have **no or negligible adverse impacts** on
167 construction worker health and safety.

168 *Accidents*

169 While adherence to applicable health and safety regulations and requirements during construction would
170 substantially minimize the potential for accidents and resultant human injury, some inherent risk would
171 remain due to the nature of the work (e.g., physical exertion and strain, use of power and hand tools,
172 presence of open excavations, work near vehicles and heavy equipment).

173 In the event of an accident involving any injury, on-site first aid-certified personnel would administer first aid
174 immediately and emergency responder services would be summoned if necessary. Construction
175 contractors experiencing minor injuries would be transported to the nearest urgent care center for treatment
176 (see **Section 1.2.3**). The Project Site’s proximity to medical and first responder services would ensure
177 potential injuries are addressed quickly. Effects of potential construction-related accidents would be

178 contained within the Project Site and limited to construction personnel in the immediate vicinity of the
179 accident. BARC employees and the general public would not be affected by construction accidents.

180 Construction contractors in appropriate PPE would immediately respond to accidental spills or releases of
181 hazardous materials (e.g., a fuel leak from a piece of construction equipment) and would clean-up those
182 accidental events in accordance with site-safety plans and applicable federal and state regulatory
183 requirements. Treasury anticipates that any effects from accidental spills or leaks would remain within the
184 Project Site. Please refer to the [Hazardous and Toxic Materials and Waste Technical Memorandum](#) for
185 more information on hazardous materials and waste during construction.

186 Overall, potential construction accidents would have **less-than-significant adverse impacts** on
187 construction worker health and safety, and be commensurate with other federal construction projects.

188 *Security and Intentionally Destructive Acts*

189 Intentionally destructive acts could occur during the Proposed Action's construction phase. These acts
190 would likely be limited to vandalism, theft of tools or equipment, and similar types of crime. The Project Site
191 would be fenced throughout the construction phase; access would be limited to construction personnel and
192 others with a demonstrated need for site access and appropriate authorization. During non-working hours,
193 vehicle and pedestrian access gates would be locked and a private security service would patrol the Project
194 Site to further deter unauthorized access and intentionally destructive acts. Should intentionally destructive
195 acts at the Project Site occur, potential effects would likely be contained to within the Project Site.
196 Construction of the Proposed Action would be unlikely to induce or increase crime in the ROI. Thus,
197 potential intentionally destructive acts during construction would have **no or negligible adverse impacts**
198 on human health and safety.

199 **Operation**

200 *Normal Activities*

201 Except for the entry and exit of vehicles associated with the proposed CPF, no operations would occur
202 outside Treasury's proposed security fence (see **Figure 1**). Administrative/office and currency production
203 activities at the proposed CPF would be conducted in accordance with all applicable federal and state OSH
204 regulations and requirements as they currently are at the DC Facility, including for hazardous materials and
205 wastes (see **Section 1.2.3**).

206 The proposed CPF, however, would have efficiency improvements compared to the DC Facility, including
207 the placement of equipment and storage on one floor. Staff in the proposed CPF would no longer have to
208 operate across multiple floors and wings of the DC Facility, thereby increasing the safety of their day-to-day
209 activities. Efficient work production flows in the proposed CPF would be flexible and could be easily
210 reconfigured, thereby placing less strain and risk on production staff. Therefore, the proposed CPF would
211 have a **beneficial impact** on human health and safety, specifically for Treasury staff.

212 *Accidents*

213 Treasury employs a highly skilled, knowledgeable, and well-trained workforce. Treasury expects this staff
214 to adhere to training requirements, work practices, and applicable federal and state regulatory requirements
215 that would prevent or substantially minimize the potential for accidents. Treasury anticipates that the
216 potential for accidents at the proposed CPF, including but not limited to fires, worker and/or visitor injuries,
217 accidental spills or releases of hazardous substances, and vehicle accidents, would remain small, localized,
218 and contained within Treasury's proposed security fence.

219 Due to the efficiency and work-flow improvements relative to the DC Facility, accident potential in the
220 proposed CPF would decrease. There would likely be a substantial decrease in the number of workplace
221 injuries as the DC Facility is phased out and the proposed CPF becomes operational. In the event of staff

222 or visitor injury, qualified personnel would administer first aid immediately and summon first responder
223 services if necessary. Workers or visitors experiencing minor injuries would be transported to the nearest
224 urgent care facility for treatment (see **Section 1.2.3**).

225 Therefore, in the long term, the reduction in the potential for accidents would have a **beneficial impact** on
226 human health and safety, specifically for Treasury staff.

227 *Security and Intentionally Destructive Acts*

228 Treasury's police force would monitor and maintain security at the proposed CPF 24 hours a day, seven
229 days a week. Similar to the DC Facility, Treasury's police force would restrict access to the facility to badged
230 employees and authorized visitors and would inspect vehicles entering and exiting the proposed CPF. New
231 security technologies to manage vehicle and staff access and monitor the proposed CPF, however, would
232 also be installed. The Proposed Action would include a multi-component security system, employing both
233 active (e.g., surveillance cameras and notification systems) and passive (e.g., well-defined and controlled
234 entry and exit areas) deterrents. Treasury's police force would inspect vehicles at a new ACP to be located
235 along the proposed entrance road. This ACP would be equipped with all required vehicle inspection and life
236 safety equipment.

237 Entry to the proposed CPF from Odell Road would not be permitted; this access road would be used as an
238 emergency exit only. The proposed security fence would comply with current anti-terrorism/force protection
239 barriers.

240 The proposed CPF would be equipped with all required passive and active security measures to deter,
241 prevent, and neutralize current and future security threats, including measures to respond to acts of
242 terrorism and armed intruders. Based on incidents at the DC Facility (see **Section 1.2.3**), security situations
243 would primarily involve unauthorized access, intruders, or trespassers. Treasury's police force would
244 typically resolve unauthorized access situations within seconds or minutes, and intruders and trespassers
245 would likely be infrequent.

246 Treasury police force presence and security measures would be expected to contain security incidents
247 within the boundaries of Treasury's proposed parcel. Further, natural barriers, such as trees and topography
248 retained on-site, would augment physical barriers and provide additional levels of protection. The design of
249 the Proposed Action would meet all applicable federal facility security requirements, including site setbacks
250 for security structures, vehicle inspection areas, parking areas, maintenance and storage sheds, and
251 fencing. Field-of-view security requirements would be met. Treasury would continue to assess potential
252 security threats to the proposed CPF over time and improve security measures accordingly.

253 Therefore, the Proposed Action would have a **beneficial impact** to Treasury security and a **less-than-**
254 **significant adverse impact** on human safety from the potential for intentionally destructive acts.

255 **1.4 Impact-Reduction Measures**

256 As part of the Proposed Action, Treasury would implement the following impact-reduction measures to
257 minimize potential adverse impacts to human health and safety:

- 258 • Ensure that first aid-qualified personnel and appropriate supervisory personnel are always present
259 on the Project Site during construction.
- 260 • Conduct regular safety meetings during construction activities to identify potential hazards.

- 261 • Prepare and adhere to a site- and project-specific health and safety plan identifying the location
262 and travel routes to the nearest hospital/emergency room (for significant/major injuries) and urgent
263 care center (for minor injuries) during construction and operation.
- 264 • Require all supervisory personnel to review and familiarize themselves with the project health and
265 safety plan. This plan would be maintained on-site throughout construction and operation.
- 266 • Require supervisory personnel, including qualified safety professionals, to be present on-site each
267 workday to monitor work protocol, worker safety, and the potential for accidents during construction
268 and operation.
- 269 • Place cleanup kits strategically throughout the Project Site for use in the event of an accidental spill
270 or release, particularly of a hazardous material such as fuel, to ensure that spilled materials and
271 their potential impacts are contained to a small area and do not have the opportunity to migrate off-
272 site.
- 273 • Continue to provide applicable health and safety training to Treasury personnel, particularly
274 personnel using and handling hazardous materials and hazardous waste.
- 275 • Continue to review and assess potential security threats and adjust security measures accordingly.

276 1.5 Mitigation Measures

277 No project-specific mitigation measures are recommended.

278 1.6 References

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